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Abstract
We provide a simple necessary and su¢ cient condition for when a multiproduct
demand system can be generated from a discrete choice model with unit demands.
Keywords: Discrete choice, unit demand, multiproduct demand functions.
1 Introduction
In a variety of economic settings the decision problem facing agents is one of discrete
choice. For example, in markets for durable goods such as cars or refrigerators, each
consumer who makes a purchase typically buys one unit of one of the products on o¤er
(or buys nothing). If vi is a consumers valuation for product i and pi is its price, then the
rational consumer will buy the product with the best value for money given her preferences,
i.e., the highest (vi   pi) if that is positive, and will otherwise buy nothing. By specifying
a probability distribution for the vector of valuations within the population of consumers,
one can derive aggregate multi-product demand as a function of the vector of prices. Such
a demand system necessarily involves products being substitutes, but otherwise appears to
permit rich possibilities of behaviour.1
Both authors at All Souls College, University of Oxford. Thanks for helpful comments are due to two
referees, as well as to Simon Anderson, Sonia Ja¤e, Howard Smith and Glen Weyl. Contact information
for corresponding author: john.vickers@economics.ox.ac.uk, tel: +44 (0)1865 279300.
1For example, Hotelling (1932, section 2) provides an early example of a discrete choice demand system.
This example exhibits Edgeworths Paradox, in which an increase in the unit cost of a product (as a result
of imposing a new tax, say) causes a multiproduct monopolist to reduce all of its prices.
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In this paper we investigate which aggregate demand functions have discrete choice
micro-foundations. With a single product, any (bounded) downward-sloping aggregate
demand function can be generated by a population of unit-demand consumers the demand
function can simply be interpreted as the fraction of consumers who are willing to pay
the specied price for their unit. With more than one product, though, the answer is less
obvious. We show that discrete choice foundations for an aggregate demand system (which
is bounded and exhibits the usual Slutsky symmetry property) exist if and only if all mixed
partial derivatives (with respect to prices) of the total quantity demanded are negative.
Thus there is a simple test for whether a given demand system is consistent with discrete
choice.
Early contributions to the theory and econometrics of discrete choice are surveyed by
McFadden (1980), who developed the modern economics of discrete choice analysis in a
variety of applications including choices of education and residential location. Relation-
ships between discrete choice models and demand systems for di¤erentiated products are
explored in chapter 3 (and elsewhere) of the classic analysis by Anderson, de Palma and
Thisse (1992). In particular, their Theorem 3.1 states necessary and su¢ cient properties
of demand functions that ensure these demands are consistent with discrete choice. Their
result presumes that consumers must buy one option or another, so that total demand
always sums to one. In most situations of interest, however, consumers have, and use, the
option to buy nothing, and we provide a result in the same spirit as Anderson et al., but
which allows for this. Indeed, the way that total demand varies with prices is the key to
our analysis.
More recently, Ja¤e and Weyl (2010) show how a linear demand system cannot be gen-
erated from (continuous) discrete choice foundations when there are at least two products
and buyers can consume an outside option.2 Ja¤e and Kominers (2012) extend this analysis
to show how (continuous) discrete choice cannot induce a demand system where demand
for each product is additively separable in its own price. The analysis in the present paper
sets those contributions in a wider context.
2Strictly speaking, they show that linear demand does not have discrete choice foundations where the
valuations are continuously distributed (so a density exists). In section 3.2 we show how linear demand
is often consistent with a discrete choice model in which the support of valuations does not have full
dimension.
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The next section states a preliminary result, which is not specic to discrete choice, that
individual product demands can be derived from the total demand function. The main
section then derives necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the total demand function to
be consistent with discrete choice, which are then illustrated by way of some applications
and extensions.
2 A preliminary result
Suppose there are n products, with associated price vector p = (p1; :::; pn), where the
aggregate demand for product i = 1; :::; n is given by qi(p)  0. We only consider prices
in the non-negative orthant Rn+, and we assume quasi-linear preferences, so that demand
qi is the derivative of an indirect utility function CS(p): qi(p)   @CS(p)=@pi, where
CS() is convex and decreasing in p. For simplicity, suppose that demand functions are
di¤erentiable, in which case we have Slutsky symmetry:
@qi(p)
@pj
 @q
j(p)
@pi
for i 6= j . (1)
Given the demand system q(p), dene Q(p)  Pni=1 qi(p) to be the total quantity of all
products demanded with the price vector p. We make the innocuous assumptions that
Q(0) > 0 and that Q(p)! 0 as all prices pi simultaneously tend to innity.
A result which is useful in the su¢ ciencypart of the following analysis, and perhaps
of interest in its own right, is the following.3
Lemma 1 Suppose the demand system satises (1). Then the demand for product i, qi(p),
satises
qi(p) =  
Z 1
0
@
@pi
Q(p1 + t; :::; pn + t)dt ; (2)
where Q Pi qi is total demand.
Proof. We need to show that
qi(p) =  
Z 1
0
@
@pi
Q(p1 + t; :::; pn + t)dt =  
Z 1
0
nX
j=1
@qj
@pi
(p1 + t; :::; pn + t)dt :
3Expression (2) remains valid if Q is continuous and piecewise-di¤erentiable. (Typically, demand is not
di¤erentiable at choke prices which make a products demand fall to zero.)
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But (1) implies that the right-hand side above is equal to
 
Z 1
0
nX
j=1
@qi
@pj
(p1 + t; :::; pn + t)dt =  
Z 1
0
d
dt
qi(p1 + t; :::; pn + t)dt = q
i(p)
as required.
Lemma 1, which is true regardless of whether demand is consistent with discrete choice,
implies that the total demand function Q() summarises all information about the demands
for individual products, which can be recovered from total demand via the procedure (2).4
3 Which demand systems are consistent with discrete
choice?
We wish to understand which restrictions on q(p) are implied if this demand system can
be generated by the simplest discrete choice model. By discrete choice modelwe mean,
rst, that any individual consumer wishes to buy a single unit of one product (or to buy
nothing). In particular, a consumer gains no extra utility from buying more than one
product or from buying more than one unit of a product. Specically and furthermore5,
the discrete choice model assumes that a consumer has a valuation vi for a unit of product i
(where valuations can be negative), where the vector of valuations v = (v1; :::; vn) is drawn
from a joint cumulative distribution function (CDF), denoted G(v), and if she makes a
purchase she buys the product which o¤ers the greatest net surplus vi   pi. If she buys
nothing she obtains a deterministic payo¤ of zero.6 Faced with price vector p, the type-v
consumer in this discrete choice problem will therefore
choose product i if vi   pi  max
j 6=i
f0; vj   pjg : (3)
4For instance, if total demand is additively separable in prices, it follows from (2) that demand for a
particular product depends only on its own price. If total demand depends only on the sum of prices, so
does the demand for each product.
5As we discuss and illustrate in section 3.3 there are settings where consumers buy one unit of one
product if they buy at all, but where (3) is not satsied (e.g., because of search or transactions costs).
Such settings do not come within the discrete choice model as we have dened it.
6The following analysis applies equally to the situation where the consumers outside option, say v0,
is stochastic, and a consumer buys product with the highest value of (vi   pi) provided this is above v0.
However, one can just subtract v0 from each vi to return to our set-up with a deterministic outside option
of zero.
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The demand for product i, qi(p), is then the measure of consumers who satisfy (3). For
most of our discussion we suppose that the distribution for v is continuous i.e., there is
a density function g() which generates G() which ensures that only a measure-zero set
of consumers have a tiein (3) and the demand system is well-dened and continuous in
prices p. (At various points we also discuss situations where the support of valuations does
not have full dimensional support in Rn, although in such cases demand is still continuous
in p.) With the choice procedure (3) a consumer buys nothing if and only if v  p, and
so the proportion of consumers who buy nothing with price vector p is just G(p). Figure
1 depicts the pattern of demand with two products, where consumers are partitioned into
three regions: those who buy product 1, those who buy product 2, and those who buy
neither.
-
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Figure 1: Pattern of demand in discrete choice model
3.1 Necessity
Any demand system arising out of the procedure (3) involves gross substitutes (i.e., cross-
price e¤ects are non-negative), since the right-hand side of (3) decreases with pj. (This can
be seen from Figure 1 in the case with two products.) That is to say, a necessary condition
for the demand system to be consistent with discrete choice is that qi(p) weakly increases
with pj for all j 6= i.
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A second restriction on the demand system q() if it is to be consistent with discrete
choice is that demand qi must weakly decrease if all prices increase by the same additive
factor. Intuitively, if the price vector increases from (p1; :::; pn) to (p1 + t; :::; pn + t), no
consumer will switch from buying one product to buying another, but some may switch
from buying product i to buying nothing. (Again, this is clear from Figure 1.) Regardless
of whether it is consistent with discrete choice, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, any
demand system which satises (1) satises
d
dt
qi(p1 + t; :::; pn + t)

t=0
=
@
@pi
Q(p) ;
where Q Pj qj is total demand. Therefore, a necessary condition for the demand system
to be consistent with discrete choice is that total demand Q weakly decreases with each
price pi.7
More generally, for a demand system consistent with discrete choice it must be that
total demand Q and the CDF G are related by
G(p)  1 Q(p) ; (4)
so that 1 Q has the properties of a joint CDF.8 This is the crucial step in our argument.
If a demand system is generated by a discrete choice framework with CDF for valuations
G, then G(p), which is the proportion of consumers who buy nothing at price vector p in
the discrete choice framework, must be equal to 1 minus the proportion of consumers who
buy something, i.e., 1   Q(p). Thus, given any demand system q(p), one can derive the
unique underlying distribution of valuations which could generate this demand via discrete
choice if such microfoundations are possible using (4).9
7Outside the class of demand systems consistent with discrete choice, it is possible to have total demand
increase with a price. For example, consider a two-product demand system where qi(p1; p2) = ai bipi+cpj .
To be consistent with a concave utility function, we require that b1b2 > c2. However, it is still possible that
bi < c for one product, in which case total output q1 + q2 increases with pi. More generally, by choosing
the units for how products are measured appropriately by measuring apples in terms of the number of
apples and oranges in terms of tons of oranges, say any demand system with substitutes can be modied
so that total outputincreases in a price.
8The 1in (4) simply reects a normalization of the measure of all consumers to be 1. The analysis
could trivially be extended to allow the total measure of consumers to be N , say, in which case total
demand Q is bounded by N rather than 1.
9More precisely, the CDF for valuations is uniquely determined for p  0. As discussed in the proof of
Lemma 2, there is some freedom to choose the distribution when some valuations are negative.
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If G is a CDF with density function g, then
G(p) 
Z p1
 1
  
Z pn
 1
g(v)dv1:::dvn : (5)
Expression (5) implies that all mixed partial derivatives of G (i.e., which do not involve
any @pimore than once), if they exist, must be non-negative, and the density g can be
recovered from G via the partial derivative
g(p)  @
n
@p1:::@pn
G(p) : (6)
Since total demand Q satises (4), the following necessary conditions on Q are immediate:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the demand system q(p) is consistent with discrete choice.
Then:
(i) total demand Q(p) Pni=1 qi(p) is continuous at p = 0;
(ii) at any price where Q is su¢ ciently di¤erentiable, for any 1  k  n and collection of
k distinct elements from f1; :::; ng denoted i1; :::; ik we have
@k
@pi1 :::@pik
Q(p)  0 ;
and the corresponding density function for valuations is
g(p) =   @
n
@p1:::@pn
Q(p) :
Proposition 1(ii) implies results derived in earlier papers. If n  2 then in any region
where total demand Q is linear in prices the valuation density must vanish, conrming the
result in Ja¤e and Weyl (2010). More generally, consider any region where demand for
each product is additively separable in its own price, so that @2qi=@pi@pj  0 for j 6= i. It
follows that the full cross-derivative @nqi=@p1:::@pn is zero for each demand function qi, and
so the same is true for total demand Q. Again, the density g must vanish in this region,
conrming the result derived by Ja¤e and Kominers (2012).10
10A similar argument implies that the density vanishes in any region in which demand functions are
additively separable in any non-trivial partition of prices. If n  2 and each demand function qi can be
written in the form Ai() +Bi(), where Ai is a function of some non-empty strict subset of prices and Bi
is a function of the remaining prices, then again @
n
@p1:::@pn
Q(p) = 0 and the density vanishes.
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However, the fact that the implied density for valuations is zero in all (or almost all) of
Rn+ does not mean that the demand system cannot arise from discrete choice. For instance,
in section 3.2 we will see that any (smooth and bounded) demand system without cross-
price e¤ects, so that qi is a function only of its own price pi, is consistent with discrete
choice, although the density will be zero within Rn+ and no consumer has positive valuation
for all n products. We will also see that a linear demand system can be consistent with
discrete choice if we allow the support of valuations not to have full dimension in Rn.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 rules out commonly used demand functions which have a
discontinuity at p = 0. For example, demand which results from homothetic preferences
(such as CES preferences) is inconsistent with a discrete choice model. In more detail,
suppose the gross utility of the representative consumeris homothetic in quantities. It
follows that net consumer surplus, CS(p), takes the form CS(p) = V (P (p)), where P (p)
is a concave and homogeneous degree 1 function of prices and V (P ) is a decreasing convex
function of the scalar price index P . Then the demand functions are
qi(p) = X(P (p))
@P (p)
@pi
; (7)
where X(P )   V 0(P ). However, the function @P (p)=@pi is homogenous degree zero, and
such functions cannot be continuous at p = 0 (unless they are constant). In sum, any
demand system based on a representative consumer with homothetic preferences is not
consistent with discrete choice, due to its behaviour when prices are close to zero.11
As a nal illustration of the use of Proposition 1, consider the demand system whereby
total demand takes the form Q(p1; p2; p3) = (1  p1)(1  p2)(1  p3) for prices 0  pi  1.12
Here, total demand decreases with each price, as required to be consistent with discrete
choice, and the corresponding density for valuations from (6) is equal to 1. However, this
demand system cannot be consistent with discrete choice since the second cross-partial
11In some contexts it is natural to bound prices away from zero, for instance because of production costs.
It is then possible for a homothetic demand system to be consistent with discrete choice in this region,
although many such demand systems also appear to violate the partial derivative conditions even when
bounded away from zero. A two-product CES demand system which is consistent with discrete choice in
the region p1; p2  1 has qi(p1; p2) =
p
pj=(pi(1 + p1p2)), which takes the form (7) with P =
p
p1p2 and
X(P ) = 2=
p
1 + P 2. One can verify that total output q1 + q2 decreases with each pi and has a negative
cross-partial derivative when p1; p2  1. The analysis in section 3.2 then shows this demand system is
consistent with discrete choice in this region.
12The corresponding individual product demands can be calculated from Lemma 1.
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derivatives, @2Q=@pi@pj, are all negative.
Remark on the interpretation of Proposition 1: In the context of discrete choice 1  Q(p)
can be interpreted as demand for the outside option of buying nothing which we may
label as notional product 0, which by assumption always gives zero consumer surplus as
a function of the prices p1; :::; pn of the n actual products. In those terms Proposition 1
is a statement about demand for product 0, and Lemma 1 shows how demand for each
product can be derived from demand for product 0. Given that the sum of demands for
products 0 to n is by construction equal to one in the discrete choice setting, the method
used to derive Lemma 1 also yields that, for any i, demand for each product (including
notional product 0) can be derived from demand qi(p) for product i. In particular, whenPn
j=0 q
j(p)  1, demand for product i can be expressed in terms of the demand function
q1(p) for (say) product 1 6= i by
qi(p0; p1; :::; pn) =  
Z 1
0
d
dt
qi(p0 + t; p1; p2 + t; :::; pn + t)dt
=
Z 1
0
@
@p1
qi(p0 + t; p1; p2 + t; :::; pn + t)dt
=
Z 1
0
@
@pi
q1(p0 + t; p1; p2 + t; :::; pn + t)dt :
The second equality uses the fact that 0 =
Pn
j=0 @q
j(p)=@pi =
Pn
j=0 @q
i(p)=@pj when
demands sum to one. So for any demand system consistent with discrete choice, knowing
the demand function for any one product implies the demand functions for all products.
This observation is useful in relating Proposition 1 to Theorem 3.1 of Anderson et al.
(1992), which was highlighted in the Introduction. For a setting where product demands
sum to one, that theorem states, among other things, that consistency with discrete choice
requires that all mixed partial derivatives of demand for each product qi(p) which do not
involve its own price pi be non-negative. Proposition 1 accords with this, but is simpler
to state, being just about total demand (equivalently demand for notional product 0)
rather than demand for each of n products. Thus it would appear that, with demands by
assumption always adding to one, Theorem 3.1 in Anderson et al. (1992) could likewise be
stated in terms of demand for a single product rather than all.
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3.2 Su¢ ciency
In this section we show, in broad terms, how the necessary conditions outlined in Propo-
sition 1 are also su¢ cient for the demand system to be consistent with a discrete choice
framework. Since we consider only non-negative prices, formula (4) for the candidate CDF
for underlying valuations is also dened only on the non-negative orthant Rn+. Because of
this, and since we wish to allow for negative valuations, we need to understand when a
function G dened only on Rn+ can be extended to create a valid CDF dened on the whole
space Rn.13
Lemma 2 Suppose G is a su¢ ciently di¤erentiable function dened on Rn+ which satises
G(0; :::; 0) = 0, G(1; :::;1) = 1, and for any 1  k  n and collection of k distinct
elements from f1; :::; ng denoted i1; :::; ik we have
@k
@pi1 :::@pik
G(p)  0 : (8)
Then G() is part of a valid CDF for a continuous distribution on Rn.
Proof. Setting k = 1 in (8) implies that G is increasing in each argument, and so G lies
in the interval [0; 1] throughout Rn+. The density g in the region Rn+ must be given by (6),
which from (8) is non-negative.
There are many ways to choose a distribution for v outside Rn+ which yield the same
CDF G when restricted to Rn+. One way to do so is as follows:
(i) If v 2 Rn+, set G^(v) = G(v).
(ii) If any component of v is strictly below  1, set G^(v) = 0.
(iii) The remaining case is where v is such that a non-empty subset S  f1; :::; ng of
products have valuations in the interval [ 1; 0), while remaining products have valuations
in [0;1). In this case we dene
G^(v) =
 Y
i2S
(1 + vi)
!
G(v+) , (9)
13Note that in the following construction the extended density is discontinuous as we cross a plane
vi  0, but that doesnt matter for the argument. One could adjust the argument to make the extended
density continuous, if desired.
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where v+ is the vector v with all negative components replaced by zero (i.e., the ith
component of v+ is vi if vi  0 and 0 otherwise).
One can check that G^ lies in the interval [0; 1] throughout Rn, is zero when any vi
is below  1, is continuous throughout Rn, and is weakly increasing throughout Rn. By
di¤erentiating (9), one sees that the density corresponding to G^ at a point v such that k < n
components of v labelled i1; :::; ik are non-negative, while all the remaining components lie
in [ 1; 0), is
g^(v) =
@n
@p1:::@pn
G^(p) =
@k
@pi1 :::@pik
G(v+) : (10)
From (8), this is non-negative as required.
Dene the extended density g^ by (i) g^(v) = @
n
@p1:::@pn
G(v) if each vi  0, (ii) g^(v) = 0 if
any vi <  1, and (iii) g^(v) is given by (10) otherwise. Since G^(v) = 0 if any component
vi =  1, it follows that
G^(p) =
Z p1
 1
  
Z pn
 1
@n
@p1:::@pn
G^(p)dv1:::dvn =
Z p1
 1
  
Z pn
 1
g^(v)dv1:::dvn :
In particular for p 2 Rn+ we have
G(p) =
Z p1
 1
  
Z pn
 1
g^(v)dv1:::dvn ;
and so G dened on Rn+ is indeed part of a valid CDF. (In particular, the extended density
g^ integrates to 1.)
Now consider a demand system q(p) which satises the required Slutsky symmetry
condition (1) such that total demand Q is di¤erentiable throughout Rn+. It follows that Q
is bounded in the neighborhood of p = 0, and without loss of generality we can therefore
normalize demand so that Q(0) = 1. Suppose that G(p)  1 Q(p) satises the conditions
in Lemma 2, i.e., that all the mixed partial derivatives of Q are non-positive. It follows
that G is part of a valid CDF for valuations v. By construction, the total demand function
which results from the discrete choice model with CDF G is precisely Q. Because the two
demand systems our original q(p) and the demand system implemented by the discrete
choice model with CDF G have the same total demand, Lemma 1 implies that the two
demand systems are the same. In particular, q(p) has discrete choice micro-foundations.
We summarise this discussion in the following:
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Proposition 2 Suppose q(p) is a demand system which satises (1) such that total demand
Q(p) Pni=1 qi(p) is su¢ ciently di¤erentiable throughout Rn+, and for any 1  k  n and
collection of k distinct elements from f1; :::; ng denoted i1; :::; ik we have
@k
@pi1 :::@pik
Q(p)  0 :
Then this demand system can be generated by discrete choice.
A demand system which satises the conditions for Proposition 2 must therefore involve
gross substitutes, since demands from a discrete choice model do so. This can be seen
directly as follows. Since Q is di¤erentiable, we can di¤erentiate both sides of (2) with
respect to pj, where j 6= i. This implies that a condition which ensures @qi=@pj  0 is that
total demand satises @2Q=@pi@pj  0 as required by Proposition 2.
Note that any smooth demand system which has no cross-price e¤ects satises the
conditions of Proposition 2, although the corresponding density g is zero throughout the
positive orthant Rn+. The construction used in Lemma 2 nds a density for valuations
which is only positive if only one valuation vi is positive. To illustrate, suppose there are
two products with independent linear demand functions qi(pi) = 12(1   pi) (and qi = 0 if
pi  1). Then one can check this demand system results from a discrete choice model with
density g(v) = 1
2
if 0  vi  1 and  1  vj  0 and j 6= i (and g(v) = 0 otherwise).
Proposition 2 applies to demand systems which are di¤erentiable throughout Rn+, and
characterized valid total demand functions in terms of the mixed partial derivatives. This
result applies most naturally to demand systems where demand is positive throughout Rn+.
However, the more fundamental property is that the total demand function Q is such that
1   Q is a valid, but not necessarily di¤erentiable, CDF. In the two-variable case, the
condition for G(v1; v2) for to be a valid CDF is that it is weakly increasing in v1 and v2 and
the di¤erence G(vH1 ; v2) G(vL1 ; v2) is weakly increasing in v2 (where vH1 > vL2 ), so that G
is increasing and supermodular, i.e., that Q = 1 G is decreasing and submodular.
To illustrate this more general case, consider the continuous and piecewise-linear de-
mand system depicted on Figure 2.14 Total demand can be calculated and the candidate
14This demand system corresponds to a representative consumer with quadratic gross utility given by
u(q1; q2) =
3
4 (q1 + q2)  38 (q21 + q22 + q1q2).
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CDF G = 1   Q then derived, as shown on the gure. One can check that this G is in-
creasing and supermodular, and so this demand system is consistent with discrete choice.
Indeed, the required distribution of valuations is that v is equally likely to lie on any of
the four bold line segments which make up the boundary of the kiteshape on the gure,
and on any line segment valuations are uniformly distributed.
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Figure 2: A linear demand system
Conversely, when total demand is not always di¤erentiable but otherwise satises the
conditions of Proposition 2, the demand system may not be consistent with discrete choice,
and so it is not enough just to check locally that the relevant partial derivatives of Q are
non-positive. To illustrate, consider the two-product example where Q(p1; p2) = 1 p1p2 if
p1p2  1 (and otherwise Q = 0).15 The function Q is weakly decreasing in both prices and
satises @2Q=@p1@p2 =  1 whenQ > 0. If this demand system was consistent with discrete
choice, the associated CDF for valuations would have to be G(p1; p2) = minfp1p2; 1g.
However, this G is not a valid CDF (unless prices are restricted to lie in the square [0; 1]2),
since it does not satisfy the increasing di¤erences property (e.g., here G(2; p2)   G(1; p2)
decreases with p2 in the range 12  p2  1).
15Again, Lemma 1 can be used to generate the corresponding individual product demand functions.
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4 Applications and extensions
We now consider some examples and extensions of the discrete choice model, and related
examples that do not accord with it.
Total demand is a completely monotonic function of an additively separable function of
prices: A rich class of demand systems consistent with discrete choice has 1   Q(p) =
Z((p)) as a completely monotonic function of a sum (p)  Pni=1 i(pi) of positive,
decreasing functions of price, one for each product.16 (A function Z : (0;1) ! R is said
to be completely monotonic if for all k the kth derivative, denoted Z(k), has the sign of
( 1)k. For our purposes it su¢ ces that this condition holds for k  n.) Then
@k
@p1:::@pk
Q(p) =  Z(k)()
kY
i=1
0i(pi) < 0 (11)
because Z(k) and the product of the 0i terms both have the sign of ( 1)k so (11) is negative.
Proposition 2 then implies that a distribution of valuations can be found which generates
this total demand via discrete choice.
The Logit demand system, perhaps the most familiar model of discrete choice, belongs
to this class.17 This demand system has
qi(p) =
1 + n
n
 e
 pi=
1 +
P
j e
 pj=
for some parameter  > 0. (Demands are normalized by the factor 1+n
n
to satisfy our
convention that Q = 1 when p = 0.) Here, 1 Q(p) = Z((p)), where Z() = 1  1+n
n

1+
and (p) =
P
i e
 pi=. Also in this class is the case of discrete choice where valuations
vi are independently distributed and non-negative. With Gi(vi) as the CDF of vi we can
write 1 Q(p) =Qni=1Gi(pi) as Z((p)), where Z() = e  and (p) =  Pni=1 logGi(pi).
(In either case, one can check that Z() is completely monotonic.)
16So that Q(0) = 1 and Q(1) = 0, suppose that each i satises i(1) = 0, while Z(i(0)) = 0 and
Z(0) = 1.
17See, for example, Anderson et al. (1992, section 7.4). The usual micro-foundations for this demand
system has consumer valuations including the value of the outside option being independent extreme
value variables. In particular, the value of the outside option is stochastic. Anderson et al. (1992, section
7.4) also present the demand system when product valuations are independent extreme value variables but
the outside option has a deterministic value of zero, but this is algebraically messier.
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Completely monotonic functions can be used more generally to extend a given discrete
choice model to a wider family. For if Q(p) satises the conditions of Proposition 2, then
so does Q^(p) = 1  (Q(p)) where  is a completely monotonic function with (0) = 1 and
(1) = 0. (One can check that any kth order mixed partial derivative of Q^(p) is a sum of
negative terms.)
Consumer search: We have dened the discrete choice model by condition (3) that the
consumer will buy the product with the highest vi  pi  0, which accords with consumers
being able to learn their valuations costlessly. However, the discrete choice model can be
used also to analyze some (but not all) settings with search costs, as the following two-
product example illustrates. Suppose that the valuation for product i has independent
CDF Gi(vi) (where both valuations are always non-negative), that the consumer knows
both prices and can observe v1 costlessly but that she has to pay search cost s, with
independent CDF F (s), to learn v2.
Assume rst that there is free recall, so that the consumer can costlessly return to
buy product 1 if she investigates but doesnt end up buying product 2. In this case, the
consumer will buy nothing if both (a) v1 < p1 and (b) either v2 < p2 or s > V (p2) R1
p2
(v2   p2)dG2(v2). Therefore the proportion who buy nothing is
1 Q(p1; p2) = G1(p1)[1  F (V (p2))(1 G2(p2))] : (12)
Denoting the square-bracketed term in (12) by ~G2(p2), we have ~G02(p2) > 0 and 1 Q(p) =
G1(p1) ~G2(p2) satises the conditions of the discrete choice model.18 In short, this model
with search costs has a counterpart without them that is consistent with discrete choice.
But that is not the case with costly recall. Suppose that a consumer who investigates
product 2 must pay a positive search cost to revisit product 1. Then Q = 1 when p1 = 0
and p2 = 1 because all consumers buy product 1 without searching further. But Q < 1
when p1 = 0 and p2 > 0 but is small enough that F (V (p2)) > 0. This is because some
consumers with low s and low v1 will investigate product 2 only to nd that v2 < p2; and
when v1 is below the re-visiting cost they will not wish to return to buy product 1 either.
18Since the joint CDF for the valuations in the corresponding discrete choice model is G(p1; p2) =
G1(p1) ~G2(p2), the distribution for v1 is unchanged from the search model, while the distribution of the
valuation for the second product is shifted downwards (since ~G2  G2), reecting the cost needed to
discover this valuation.
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Therefore, Q is not monotonic in p2 and the discrete choice model does not apply. To
illustrate most starkly, suppose there are no search costs but the consumer cannot return
to buy product 1 if she does not purchase it immediately. She will then buy product 1 if
v1 p1  V (p2), and otherwise she buys product 2 if v2  p2. Thus, she buys nothing with
probability
1 Q(p1; p2) = G1(p1 + V (p2))G2(p2) :
Then Q must sometimes increase with p2 when p1 = 0, since Q tends to 1 as p2 becomes
large, and this is inconsistent with a discrete choice model.
Extending discrete choice to allow consumers to buy several products: An extension of
the standard discrete choice model allows consumers to buy several products, rather than
having to choose just one. The question then arises when this extended notion of discrete
choice conforms with the basic one described at the start of section 3. To examine this issue
briey, suppose for simplicity there are two products, that vi is a consumers valuation for
product i = 1; 2 on its own, while her valuation for the bundle of both products is v1+v2 z
for some constant z  0. Here, z reects an intrinsic disutilityfrom joint consumption,
reecting an assumption that the products are partial substitutes. (The usual model of
discrete choice is the limiting case of this when z !1.) The pattern of demand given the
pair of prices (p1; p2) is shown in Figure 3.19
If F (v1; v2) is the CDF for (v1; v2), then total demand with prices (p1; p2) is
Q = 1  F (p1; p2) + f1  F (p1 + z;1)  F (1; p2 + z) + F (p1 + z; p2 + z)g :
(Here, the term in brackets fg is the fraction of consumers who buy both products.) Then
Q decreases with each price pi, as needed to be consistent with the usual discrete choice
model with single-product demand. The cross-partial derivative is
@2Q
@p1@p2
= f(p1 + z; p2 + z)  f(p1; p2) ;
where f is the density function for valuations (v1; v2). Thus, if the above expression is
always negative which is the case, for instance, if f decreases with (v1; v2) the demand
19This gure is taken from Armstrong (2013). Gentzkow (2007) empirically investigates a related discrete
choice model in which some consumers purchase two items.
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system induced by this extended discrete choice model is consistent with another basic
discrete choice model in which consumers buy at most one product.
-
6
 
 
  
-
6
p1 p1 + z
p2 + z
p2
v1
v2
buy only 1
buy bothbuy only 2
buy nothing
Figure 3: Pattern of demand when products are partial substitutes
Extending discrete choice to allow consumers to buy multiple units of their chosen product :
The nal extension we examine allows consumers to buy their chosen product in continuous
quantities, although as in the basic discrete choice model each consumer buys at most one
product.20 Specically, suppose that all consumers have the same demand for a given
product, and each consumer has demand xi(pi) if she buys product i with price pi. Let
si(pi) be the consumer surplus function which corresponds to xi(pi). Consumers incur
idiosyncratic additive shocks to their surplus vector (e.g., in their transport costs to
reach a product), denoted  = ( 1; :::; n), and the type- consumer chooses the buy the
product with the highest value of si(pi)  i (or buys nothing if  i  si(pi) for all products).
Let X i(s) be the fraction of consumers who choose product i when the surplus vector is
s = (s1; :::; sn).
As in any discrete choice problem of this form, X i increases with si and decreases with
20See Hanemann (1984) for an early investigation of this demand model. Anderson et al. (1987) show
CES demand can be generated from a demand system in which a consumer buys just one product but has
downward-sloping demand for the chosen product.
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any other sj. Aggregate demand for product i is
qi(p) = X i(s(p))xi(pi) ;
and so total demand is
Q(p) =
nX
i=1
X i(s(p))xi(pi) :
It follows that
@Q
@pi
= X ix0i   xi
X
j
@Xj
@si
xj ; (13)
which we claim is ambiguous in sign.
To see this, consider the symmetric two-product case with X1 = () an increasing
function of the surplus di¤erence   s(p1)  s(p2) and X2 = ( ). Instances of this are
the Hotelling model where () = maxf1
2
[1+ 
t
]; 0g where t < 1 is a transport cost, and the
logit formulation with () = 1
1+e  . Suppose that demand for the chosen product takes
the exponential form, so that s(p) = x(p) = e p. Then from (13) we have
@Q
@p1
= x01   x1(x1   x2)0 =  x1( + 0) (14)
and
@2Q
@p1@p2
=  x1x2(20 + 00) : (15)
In the Hotelling model with prices such that jj < t, (14) implies
@Q
@p1
=  x1

1
2
+

t

:
So when    t we have @Q
@p1
 x1
2
> 0 and there is inconsistency with the basic discrete
choice model. Increasing the high price, p1, reduces demand from the few consumers who
continue to buy that product but causes others to switch to product 2, of which they buy
substantially more.
With the logit formulation we have 0 = (1  ) > 0, so from (14)
@Q
@p1
=  x1[1 + (1  )] < 0
because  >  1. Expression (15) implies that the cross-partial of Q is
@2Q
@p1@p2
=  x1x2[2 + (1  2)]0 < 0 :
Therefore, this demand system with logit shocks to consumer surplus and exponential
demand for the chosen product is consistent with the basic discrete choice model.
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5 Conclusion
Propositions 1 and 2 together show that, assuming that total demand is di¤erentiable and
bounded, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for consistency with the discrete choice
model is that all mixed partial derivatives of total demand be non-positive. (More funda-
mentally, without requiring di¤erentiability the condition is that 1 Q exhibits the required
properties of a joint CDF.) This is a strong form of product substitutability.
We have focused on the basic discrete choice model where each consumer buys one
unit of one product, specically the product with highest (vi   pi), or else nothing. But
in a setting with consumer search and free recall, where consumers do not always buy the
product with the highest (vi   pi), was shown to be equivalent to a basic discrete choice
model that by denition meets the condition. We also showed that situations in which
consumers could buy a unit of more than one product, or could buy several units of their
chosen product, was sometimes equivalent to the basic unit-choice setting. So the analysis
of the basic discrete choice model has more general application.
We have also focused on those situations in which linear prices are used. However, even
if an aggregate demand system is consistent with discrete choice with linear prices, it may
exhibit very di¤erent properties when more ornate tari¤s are employed. For instance, when
facing unit-demand consumers, a seller can never benet from the use of two-part tari¤s,
nonlinear pricing or bundling, while if the seller faced a single consumer with the same
aggregate demand it will usually prefer to use a two-part tari¤ instead of linear prices.
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